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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
a plaintiff can recover where he is injured in an attempt to retrieve a cus-
tomer's hat.9 Kansas is in line with Missouri applying the stricter rule.' 0
No cases have been found on this point in Oklahoma or Kentucky.11
The liberal view seems to be the majority view throughout the country.12
0. J. G.
WITNESSES-HUSBAND AND WIFE-EXTENT OF CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNI-
CATIONS-[Missouri.-In an action to recover damages for personal in-
juries alleged to have been received by the plaintiff from being hit by a
truck belonging to defendant, the trial court excluded testimony of the
plaintiff's husband offered by defendant, in contradiction of plaintiff on
the trial, and tending to show that she was contemplating making her case
by perjured testimony. Held; That any spouse, while the relation of mar-
riage exists, or subsequently, shall not be permitted to testify as to any
admissions or statements, or confidential communications of the other spouse
made to him or her; although our statutes, from time to time, have largely
abolished the common law and reconstructed the rule relating to similar
evidence upon modern lines. Dickinson v. Abernathy Furniture Co.,
It would seem that under the particular facts of the case the same deci-
sion would have been reached by all jurisdictions. The case is important,
however, because it upholds the comprehensive Missouri rule: That any
communications between husband and wife made in the absence of third
persons are incompetent and must be excluded. In the body of the opinion
the court states, "There are no restrictions imposed upon the conversation
in the relationship of husband and wife, and no exceptions spring there-
from." 2 This is the Missouri rule, both under the statutory provision3 and
under case holdings. 4
From time to time, however, Missouri courts have been forced to admit
such evidence in a particular case. The original rule has always been sus-
N. E. 285 (1892); Contra, Missouri case on exact same factual set up,
Logan v. Wabash R. R. Co., 96 Mo. App. 461, 70 S. W. 734 (1902); St.
Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 115 Ark. 529, 171 S. W. 1187 (1914);
Idem, 115 Ark. 602, 174 S. W. 546 (1915).
9. Lamparter v. Walbaum, 45 Ill. 444, 92 Am. Dec. 225 (1867).
10. Condiff v. Kansas City Ft. S. & G. R. Co., 45 Kan. 256, 25 Pac. 562
(1891).
11. Dictum in the case of Mohan Jellico Coal Co. v. Bird, 167 Ky. 697,
1. c. 702, 181 S. W. 339 (1916) indicates that the strict rule would be ap-
plied if such a case arose.
12. McKay v. Alantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 160 N. C. 260, 75 S. E. 1081
(1912); Davis v. Savannah Lumber Co., 11 Ga. App. 610, 75 S. E. 986
(1912) ; Finnigan v. Biehl, 61 N. Y. Supp. 1116 (1899); Thompson v. Sea-
board Air Liner Ry., 81 S. C. 333, 62 S. E. 396, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 426
(1908); Temple Electric Light Co. v. Halliburton, 136 S. V. 584 (Tex.
1911); 45 C. J. 968; 3 Cooley, On Torts (1932) sec. 487.
1. 96 S. W. (2d) 1086 (Mo. App., 1936).
2. 96 S. W. (2d) 1086, 1094.
3. R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 1728.
4. Moore v. Moore, 51 Mo. 118 (1872); Berlin v. Berlin, 52 Mo. 151
(1873); Miller v. Miller, 14 Mo. App. 418 (1883); Ayers v. Ayers, 28 Mo.
App. 97 (1887).
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tained, but a distinction drawn in each case: for instance, ex necessitate
rei,15 fraud, 6 verbal assault,7 abuse,8 or peculiarly within the knowledge of
the spouse.9 The question arises, did not these cases recognize exceptions to
the general rule? But the bulk of the decisions and the language of the
statute affirm the statement that conversations between husband and wife
are unrestricted and that there are no exceptions to the rule excluding such
testimony.
The same general position is taken by Arkansas,10 Kansas,." Oklahoma12
and Kentuckyl under statutes and case holdings. Illinois, however, has
enacted a statutory exception to the general rule, allowing testimony as to
admissions and conversations to be admitted in suits between the husband
and wife.14
Considering the policy of the rule, viz., preservation of the inviolability
of domestic confidence," it is apparent that the policy is best served by a
broad and unrestricted rule excluding all such testimony. But Professor
Wigmore, citing several jurisdictions, would limit the meaning of confidence
to matters involving the "fundamental element of confidence."' 0 Also he
maintains that the rule should not be allowed where the disadvantages to
the general public outweigh the benefit obtained from the exercise of the
privilege; and therefore the same exceptions to this rule should be recog-
nized as were discoverable at common law under the privilege of husband
and wife testifying against each other.17
The adoption of these qualifications upon the rule of confidential com-
munications between husband and wife would do much to clear up the con-
fusion existing in the Missouri decisions on this point.'8  J. R. G.
5. Henry v. Sneed, 99 Mo. 407, 12 S. W. 663 (1889).
6. Mockel v. Heim, 134 Mo. 576, 36 S. W. 226 (1896); Henry v. Sneed,
supra; Rice v. Waddill, 168 Mo. 99, 67 S. W. 605 (1902).
7. Meyer v. Meyer, 158 Mo. App. 299, 138 S. W. 70 (1911).
8. Maget v. Maget, 85 Mo. App. 6 (1900) ; Schweikert v. Schweikert, 108
Mo. App. 477, 83 S. W. 1095 (1904).
9. Sauter and Adams v. Scrutchfield, 28 Mo. App. 150 (1887); Schweik-
ert v. Schweikert, supra, note 8.
10. Ark., C.,& M. Digest of the Statutes of Ark. (1921) sec. 4146; Berlin
v. Cantrell, 33 Ark. 611 (1878) ; Nolen v. Harden, 43 Ark. 307 (1884).
11. R. S. Kansas (1923) chap. 60, sec. 2805; Van Zandt v. Shuyler, 2
Kan. App. 118 (1895); Wingrove v. Williams, 6 Kan. App. 262 (1897);
Jacquith v. Davidson, 21 Kans. 341 (1878).
12. Okla., Harlow Okla. Statutes (1931) chap. 2, art. 10, sec. 272; Adkins
v. Wright, 37 Okla. 771, 131 Pac. 686 (1913); Potter v. Womack, 63 Okla.
107, 162 Pac. 801 (1917).
13. Ky. Civil Code Prac. sec. 606 (1); Willey v. Howell, 168 Ky. 466,
182 S. W. 619 (1916) ; Leucht v. Leucht, 129 Ky. 700, 112 S. W. 845 (1908).
14. Ill., Smith-Hurd R. S. (1935) chap. 51, sec. 5.
15. 5 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed. 1923) see. 2332.
16. 5 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed. 1923) sec. 2336.
17. 5 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed. 1923) sec. 2338. These exceptions
were assault and battery, corporal violence, desertion, custody of children,
adultery, deprivation or injury of property, and others of a similar nature.
These are discussed in 4 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed. 1923) see. 2239.
18. See notes 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 above; and question propounded in the
body of the comment.
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